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Obscenity as a Public
Nuisance in California
By Roger Oglesby*
It is doubtful that Sir Charles Sydlye recognized the significance of his
actions when in, 1663, he stood naked upon a balcony in a London tavern
and threw bottles filled with urine into the crowd below, while giving a
speech punctuated with profanity.
For one thing, Sir Charles was drunk. For another, it is unlikely that he
had the prescience to foresee the ungainly body of Anglo-American law that
would mark his frolic as its genesis. For Sir Charles, it was merely an
embarrassing incident that cost him a fine and a week in jail. But for the
common law of England, it was a fateful event. Sir Charles Sydlye's Case' is
generally considered to be the first pure obscenity case in Anglo-American
law.2
This note will focus on one of the most recent twists in the winding path
between Sir Charles Sydlye's Case and modern obscenity controls-a June,
1976 California Supreme Court decision, People ex rel. Busch v. Projection
Room Theater.' Busch added a new weapon to the anti-obscenity arsenal in
California: nuisance abatement. The caliber of this weapon has not yet been
determined.
First, this note touches briefly on relevant United States Supreme Court
decisions that set the stage for Busch. This involves a short review of the
general approach that the Court has taken to obscenity regulation in the First
Amendment context and a discussion of the vagueness difficulties inherent
in that approach. A look at the Busch decision itself follows, and the two
California Supreme Court majority opinions4 filed in the case are compared.
* Member, second-year class.
1. 83 Eng. Rep. 1146 (1663) (also reported as Le Roy v. Sr. Charles Sydlye, 82
Eng. Rep. 1036 (1663).
2. F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 4 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
SCHAUER].
3. 17 Cal: 3d 42, 550 P.2d 600, 130 Cal. Rptr. 328, cert. denied sub nom. Van de
Kamp v. Projection Room Theater, 97 S. Ct. 320 (1976).
4. The opinions, written by Justice Richardson, will be referred to throughout this
note as the majority opinions, though the second Richardson opinion spoke for a majority
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Justice Tobriner's dissent is used as a vehicle for analyzing the final Busch
holding and its weaknesses. Next, there is a short discussion of the "balanc-
ing of interests" aspect of nuisance law and how the court dealt--or failed to
deal-with this factor in Busch. Finally, there follows a discussion of the
potential scope of the Busch decision, concluding with an argument against
extending its rationale to recognition of nuisance actions by private indi-
viduals against alleged obscenity.
I. Modern Obscenity Law
A. Exclusion by Definition
It was not until 1957 that the United States Supreme Court squarely
confronted the issue of whether obscene material5 could be constitutionally
suppressed by the state and federal governments. In Roth v. United States,6
Justice Brennan, writing for a majority of the Court, framed the issue as
"whether obscenity is utterance within the area of protected speech and
press."' Thus stated, the issue became one of exclusion from First Amend-
ment8 protection by definition. The Court refused to apply the traditional
"clear and present danger" test developed in the context of political
speech. 9 Nor did the majority invoke the balancing approach that has been
used in other areas of First Amendment dispute,1" despite Justice Harlan's
protestations that in failing to do so the majority was painting with too broad
a brush11 and was thus "beg[ging] the very question before us."12 Rather,
relying on dicta in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire3 and drawing upon the
of the court on all issues only because of the special concurrence of Justice Mosk on the
blanket injunction issue. See notes 63 & 65 infra.
5. "Obscenity" will be used throughout this note to refer to that class of sexually
oriented material that has been held constitutionally unprotected under the line of Supreme
Court cases beginning with Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). It includes that
class of expression some term "pornography."
6. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
7. Id. at 481.
8. "Congress shall make no law . . .abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
9. 354 U.S. at 486-87.
10. Id. at 484-87. For examples of application of the balancing approach to First
Amendment controversies, see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (free speech
interests balanced against state's interest in preventing lawless activity); Pickering v. Bd.
of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (free speech interests balanced against state's interest in
promoting efficiency of its employees' public services); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S.
258 (1967) (freedom of association interests balanced against national defense interests).
11. 354 U.S. at 496 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).
12. Id. at 497.
13. 315 U.S. 568 (1942) ("fighting words" held to be no essential part of any
exposition of ideas and the First Amendment interest in their protection thus outweighed
by the social interest in order and morality). The Roth majority quoted this language from
Chaplinsky: "There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional
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holding in Beauharnais v. Illinois'4 that libel was beyond the pale of the
First Amendment, the Roth majority held that obscenity is, by definition,
"not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press."15
The standard laid down by the Roth majority was "whether to the
average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest."l" This
was not merely a threshold inquiry; it was stated as the dispositive test.
Expression that fell within this definition was doomed to absolute exclusion
from First Amendment protection. The only limitation imposed upon the
broad sweep of this standard arose out of the following language in Justice
Brennan's opinion: "All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social
importance-unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to
the prevailing climate of opinion-have the full protection of the guaranties
[of the First Amendment], unless excludable because they encroach upon
the limited area of more important interests."' 7 This language did not appear
as part of the Roth standard, however, and it was not until nine years later
that this "social importance" or "value" factor was incorporated as a
decisive element of the Court's obscenity standard.' 8
B. The Vagueness Dilemma
Roth touched off a storm of confusion and strong criticism.19 Its stan-
dard provoked heated debate and a plethora of litigation over what was in
fact obscene and thus constitutionally unprotected expression.2" Even the
problem. These include the lewd and obscene . . . It has been well observed that such
utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly out-
weighed by the social interest in order and morality .... ." 354 U.S. at 485 (quoting
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942)).
14. 343 U.S. 250 (1952). Justice Douglas, dissenting strenuously in Roth, argued
that "[tihe First Amendment, its prohibition in terms absolute, was designed to preclude
courts as well as legislatures from weighing the values of speech against silence." 354
U.S. at 514 (Douglas, J., dissenting). He characterized Beauharnais as the only instance
in the history of the Supreme Court in which the Court had "resolved problems of free
speech and free press by placing any form of expression beyond the pale of the absolute
prohibition of the First Amendment." Id. The definitional approach used against libel in
Beauharnais was later disapproved in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
268-69 (1964).
15. 354 U.S. at 485.
16. Id. at 489.
17. Id. at 484.
18. See notes 25-28 and accompanying text infra.
19. See, e.g., Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SuP. CT.
REV. 1; 1957 U. ILL. L. F. 499; 60 W. VA. L. REV. 89 (1957). See also I. BRANT,
THE BILL OF RIGHTS 491-92 (1965); T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF
ExPRESSION 487 (1970).
20. SCHAUER, supra note 2, at 39-40. Roth was hailed by the proponents of cen-
sorship as a victory for their cause. C. REMBAR, THE END OF OBSCENITY 57 (1968)
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justices of the Supreme Court responsible for instituting the standard could
not agree on what it meant in application.21 At the height of the constitu-
tional chaos, Justice Stewart, concurring in Jacobellis v. Ohio,22 wrote:
I have reached the conclusion, which I think is confirmed at least by
negative implication in the Court's decisions since Roth and Alberts,23
that under the First and Fourteenth Amendments criminal laws in this
area are constitutionally limited to hard-core pornography. I shall not
today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be
embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never
succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the
motion picture involved in this case is not that.
24
The issue most debated in the wake of Roth was the extent to which
expression that could claim some "redeeming social value" was immune
from obscenity prosecution. 2 In 1966 the Court met this question head on in
A Book Named "John Cletand's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v.
Attorney General of Massachusetts,26 in which the plurality opinion held
that expression could not be found obscene unless it was "utterly without
redeeming social value.'"'2 Opponents of censorship hailed the Memoirs
decision as a conclusive victory, for what written expression could be held
to be utterly without redeeming social value?28 But their jubilation was
[hereinafter cited as REMBAR]. However, subsequent appeals made it clear that the Su-
preme Court had not intended to give district attorneys carte blanche to prosecute offen-
ders against the public morality. See Note, More Ado About Dirt*v Books, 75 YALE L.J.
1364, 1373 n.40 (1966) and cases cited therein [hereinafter cited as Dirty Books.]. What
was not to become clear for some time was exactly what the Supreme Court had in-
tended.
21. See Dirty Books, supra note 20, at 1373-77.
22. 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
23. Alberts v. California, an appeal from the Appellate Department of the Superior
Court of Los Angeles County, was consolidated with Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476
(1957), for purposes of decision. Id. at 476. (explanatory footnote).
24. 378 U.S. at 197 (Stewart, J., concurring).
25. Justices Brennan and Goldberg asserted in Jacobellis that material could not be
held obscene unless it was utterly without social importance. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S.
184, 191 (1964). The rest of the Court, however, did not express an opinion on this is-
sue.
26. 383 U.S. 413 (1966) (the book was commonly known as FANNY HILL).
27. Id. at 419. Only three justices joined the controlling opinion that set down this
standard in Memoirs. However, two others, Justices Black and Douglas, concurred on
broader grounds. A sixth, Justice Stewart, concurred on grounds that only "hard-core
pornography" may be suppressed. Thus, as the Court recognized in Marks v. United
States, 45 U.S.L.W. 4233 (U.S. Mar. 1, 1977) (No. 75-708), "[t]he view of the
Memoirs plurality therefore constituted the holding of the Court and provided the govern-
ing standards," including the "utterly without redeeming social value" element. Id. at
4234-35.
28. It was in the wake of Memoirs that Charles Rembar, who had defended the
book involved before the Supreme Court, wrote The End of Obscenity. REMBAR, supra
note 20. He closed the book with these words: "So far as writing is concerned, I have
said there is no longer any law of obscenity. I would go farther and add, so far as writing
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premature; obscenity prosecutions continued, and the confusion over what
constituted obscenity was unabated.29 Certainly, disagreement among Su-
preme Court justices increased, if anything. Between Memoirs in 1966 and
Miller v. California3" in 1973, the Court reversed or affirmed obscenity
convictions per curiam and without full opinions.31 The Court was badly
split and seemed to be entirely incapable of agreeing on a uniform rationale
for its decisions.3"
Finally, in 1973, a five-member majority33 was mustered, and in Miller
the Court articulated a new obscenity standard:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether "the
average person, applying contemporary community standards" would
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest,
; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value.3 4
The Court held that the "contemporary community standards" by
which the prurience and patent offensiveness of allegedly obscene material
are to be judged need not be national in scope, but it did not specify
precisely what their scope should be. 35 Element (c) of the standard took the
is concerned, that not only in our law but in our culture, obscenity will soon be gone."
Id. at 493.
29. See Lockhart, Escape from the Chill of Uncertainty, 9 GA. L. REV. 533, 544
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Lockhart].
30. 413 U.S. 1 (1973).
31. The case that set the trend was Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967),
involving magazines containing pictures of women with exposed breasts and short stories
concerning various sexual episodes. The per curiam decisions following Redrup are
catalogued and discussed in Huffman v. United States, 470 F.2d 386, 395-401 (D.C. Cir.
1971). The 31 per curiam reversals of obscenity convictions are listed in a footnote in
Justice Brennan's dissent in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 82 n.8 (1973)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
32. See Lockhart, supra note 29, at 544. See also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,
413 U.S. 49, 83-84 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
33. Burger, C.J., and White, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ.
34. 413 U.S. at 24. California has yet to adopt the Miller "value" standard. The
language of California Penal Code section 311 (West Supp. 1977), which defines obscen-
ity, is that of the opinion in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966). Thus, Cali-
fornia retains the Memoirs "utterly without redeeming social value" standard rather than
the Miller "serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value" standard. See text ac-
companying notes 25-27 supra. The California Supreme Court held the state's obscenity
statutes constitutional as set out in the Penal Code and "authoritatively construed" by the
courts in Bloom v. Municipal Court, 16 Cal. 3d 71, 545 P.2d 229, 127 Cal. Rptr. 317
(1976).
35. 413 U.S. at 30-34. See Lockhart, supra note 29, at 548-52. This issue was
discussed subsequently in Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 157 (1974), and Hamling v.
United States, 418 U.S. 87, 103-10 (1974), but the only principle that the Court made
absolutely clear was that it was not going to define the "community" whose standards are
to be applied. See text accompanying notes 117-18 infra.
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place of the "utterly without redeeming social value" element of
Memoirs.36 What the Court intended to include in the categories of "liter-
ary, artistic, political, or scientific" and, more important, what was meant
by "serious" are questions yet to be resolved. Nor is it entirely clear what
was meant by the phrase "specifically defined by the applicable state law"
in element (b). But the Court did specify that the applicable state law was to
be considered "as written or authoritatively construed."3"
Justice Brennan, the author of the Roth opinion, dissented in Miller and
Paris Adult Theatre I. v. Slaton,38 as well as the other three obscenity cases
decided the same day.39 Echoing the dissenting arguments of Justices Doug-
las and Black in Roth,4" Justice Brennan wrote:
Our experience with the Roth approach has certainly taught us that
the outright suppression of obscenity cannot be reconciled with the fun-
damental principles of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. For we
have failed to formulate a standard that sharply distinguishes protected
from unprotected speech. . . . By disposing of cases through summary
reversal or denial of certiorari we have deliberately and effectively
obscured the rationale underlying the decisions. It comes as no surprise
that judicial attempts to follow our lead conscientiously have often ended
in hopeless confusion.41
Of the nine justices sitting on the nation's highest bench whenRoth was
decided, only Justice Brennan remains on the Court. After fifteen years of
grappling with the definitional approach to obscenity that he had first articu-
lated, Justice Brennan reached the conclusion that the struggle was hopeless.
In short, while I cannot say that the interests of the State-apart
from the question of juveniles and unconsenting adults-are trivial or
nonexistent, I am compelled to conclude that these interests cannot jus-
tify the substantial damage to constitutional rights and to this Nation'sjudicial machinery that inevitably results from state efforts to bar the
distribution even of unprotected material to consenting adults. I would
hold, therefore, that at least in the absence of distribution to juveniles or
obtrusive exposure to unconsenting adults, 42 the First and Fourteenth
Amendments prohibit the State and Federal governments from attempt-
ing wholly to suppress sexually oriented materials on the basis of their
allegedly "obscene" contents.4 3
36. 413 U.S. at 24-25.
37. Id. at 24.
38. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
39. The other three obscenity cases decided that day are Kaplan v. California, 413
U.S. 115 (1973); United States v. 12 200-Foot Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123
(1973); and United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973).
40. 354 U.S. at 512 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
41. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 83 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing).
42. Justice Brennan specifically reserved judgment on the issue of obscenity con-
trols in cases involving juveniles or unconsenting adults. 413 U.S. at 114 n.29 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 112-13 (citations omitted).
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Justice Brennan, then-along with Justices Stewart and Marshall, who con-
curred in his dissent 44-has had enough of the Roth-Memoirs-Miller chaos.
But the majority of the United States Supreme Court still adheres to the
exclusion-by-definition approach, as does the California Supreme Court.
H. California's New Approach
A. The Busch Holding
The California Supreme Court most recently reaffirmed its commit-
ment to the exclusion-by-definition approach in People ex rel. Busch v.
Projection Room Theater,45 in which it endorsed a new vehicle for control-
ling obscenity. In Busch, five civil actions were brought by the Los Angeles
city attorney and the Los Angeles County district attorney against defend-
ants allegedly operating bookstores or motion picture theaters in which
obscene materials were being exhibited. The actions, seeking injunctive
relief, were brought under both the general nuisance statutes 46 and the state
Red Light Abatement Law.4" Defendants filed general demurrers, and the
44. It appears that Justice Stevens, who was not on the Court at the time of Miller,
may agree that the exclusion-by-definition approach to obscenity is futile. In a separate
opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, in Marks v. United States, 45
U.S.L.W. 4233 (U.S. Mar. 1, 1977) (No. 75-708), Justice Stevens wrote: "[T]he present
constitutional standards, both substantive and procedural, which apply to [obscenity] pros-
ecutions are so intolerably vague that evenhanded enforcement of the law is a virtual im-
possibility." 45 U.S.L.W. at 4236.
45. 17 Cal. 3d 42, 550 P.2d 600, 130 Cal. Rptr. 328 (1976), cert. denied sub
nom. Van de Kamp v. Projection Room Theater, 97 S. Ct. 320 (1976).
46. Definitions of "nuisance" are found in both the California Penal Code and the
California Civil Code:
"Anything which is injurious to health, or is indecent, or offensive to the senses, or
an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoy-
ient of life or property by an entire community or neighborhood, or by any considerable
number of persons, or unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use, in the customary
manner, of any navigable lake, or river, bay, stream, canal, or basin, or any public park,
square, street, or highway, is a public nuisance." CAL. PENAL CODE § 370 (West 1970)
(emphasis added).
"Anything which is injurious to health, or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or
an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoy-
ment of life or property, or unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use, in the customary
manner, of any navigable lake, or river, bay, stream, canal, or basin, or any public park,
square, street, or highway, is a nuisance." CAL. CIV. CODE § 3479 (West 1970) (em-
phasis added).
"A public nuisance is one which affects at the same time an entire community or
neighborhood, or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the an-
noyance or damage inflicted upon individuals may be unequal." CAL. CIV. CODE § 3480
(West 1970).
Compare the punctuation in the italicized portions, which was highly significant to
the Busch dissenters. See notes 79-87 and accompanying text infra.
47. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11225-11235 (West 1970).
Spring 1977] OBSCENITY AS A PUBLIC NUISANCE
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
trial court sustained the demurrers without leave to amend.4" Judgments of
dismissal were entered and plaintiffs appealed.
With respect to the Red Light Abatement Law, the supreme court
sustained the trial court decision, holding that the term "lewdness" 49 in the
Red Light Abatement Law "is broad enough to include live lewd entertain-
ment, such as stage shows or other exhibitions featuring obscene perfor-
mances," 5 but not the exhibition of obscene magazines or films. In a
classic example of deference to legislative intent, the supreme court said:
If the Legislature had desired or intended by [the Red Light Abatement
Law] to regulate the showing of pornographic films, pictures or draw-
ings, such subject matter could have been included in [the statute] when
it was recently amended in 1969, as it did when it chose to enumerate
"illegal gambling as defined by state law or local ordinance. ... ""
However, with respect to the general public nuisance statutes, the court
held:
California's public nuisance definition, including as it does indecency,
comports fully with the state's power to regulate as recently declared
both by the federal Supreme Court and by ourselves and fortifies our
conclusion that public nuisance laws may properly be employed to regu-
late the exhibition of obscene material to "consenting adults.'"'" .
In so holding, the court specifically disapproved a substantial portion of
Harmer v. Tonylyn Productions, Inc. " In Harmer, the court of appeal held
that California's public nuisance statutes did not encompass the showing of
an obscene film within a theater open only to those willing to pay to see such
entertainment:
The film involved was shown only in a closed theatre. . . Thus, only
those members of the community were exposed to the film who voluntar-
ily chose to see it. This is not a case where the community as a whole is
forced to submit involuntarily to vile odors or air pollution or to the
unwelcome presence of animals. In the statute's terms, the alleged nui-
sance at the bench did not . . . "affect at the same time an entire
community or neighborhood ..
48. 17 Cal. 3d at 42, 550 P.2d at 600, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
49. Under the Red Light Abatement Law, "[e]very building or place used for the
purpose of illegal gambling as defined by state law or local ordinance, lewdness, assigna-
tion, or prostitution" constitutes a nuisance. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11225 (West 1970).
50. 17 Cal. 3d at 61, 550 P.2d at 611, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
51. Id., 550 P.2d at 611-12, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 339-40. As the majority in Busch
pointed out,_ the Red Light Abatement Law affords remedies "not available under the
general nuisance statutes, including temporary injunctions, removal and sale of fixtures,
and closure of the premises for one year." Id. at 60, 550 P.2d at 611, 130 Cal. Rptr. at
339. Thus, the impact of Busch would have been far more drastic had the court endorsed
plaintiffs' Red Light Abatement action. It is worth noting, however, that the court expres-
sed its belief that the applicability of the Red Light Abatement Law was "not free from
doubt." Id. at 62, 550 P.2d at 612, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 340.
52. Id. at 53, 550 P.2d at 606, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 334 (emphasis added).
53. 23 Cal. App. 3d 941, 100 Cal. Rptr. 576 (1972).
54. Id. at 943, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 576-77 (citations omitted). The statutory language
is from California Civil Code section 3480 (West 1970), quoted in note 46 supra.
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Justice Richardson, writing for the Busch majority, characterized this
as a faulty analysis of the "nature of the state's interests in regulating the
exhibition of obscene matter."" Citing Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,56
the majority held that obscene materials constitute a public nuisance not
because of any sensory assault upon the unwilling viewer, but because of
their "tendency to injure the community or to jeopardize the maintenance of
a decent society."" 7
B. The Question of Prior Restraint
Having thus determined that obscenity, as a threat to the maintenance
of a "decent society," was subject to regulation under the state's broad
general nuisance statutes, the California Supreme Court was faced with yet
another issue of constitutional proportions: Should a civil determination that
a defendant was dealing in obscene materials warrant clamping a padlock on
his or her place of business? This was an issue not easily laid to rest, as is
apparent from a perusal of the two supreme court majority opinions handed
down in the Busch case. The first was issued March 4, 1976.58 The court
filed a modified opinion on June 1, 1976. 5' The modification was substan-
tial.
In the firstBusch opinion, after holding that suppressing obscenity "by
means of an injunction proper and suitable to the facts of each case" 6" was
proper under the general nuisance statutes, a majority of four,61 with Justice
Richardson writing, said:
We express no opinion upon the further question whether the court
may, in addition, either close the premises entirely or enjoin further
"obscene" exhibitions regarding materials not yet adjudged obscene.
Several cases suggest that such further forms of relief would be appropri-
ate and constitutionally permissible. Other cases have held that such
relief would constitute an invalid prior restraint of presumptively pro-
tected materials. Since the United States Supreme Court has not yet
spoken on this difficult question, -and since in this posture of the case the
issue is not before us,62 we leave the question open for further considera-
tion.63
55. 17 Cal. 3d at 51, 550 P.2d at 605, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 333.
56. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
57. 17 Cal. 3d at 53, 550 P.2d at 606, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 334.
58. 546 P.2d 733, 128 Cal. Rptr. 229 (1976).
59. See note 45 supra. This was the final opinion in the case and the one on which
this note focuses.
60. 546 P.2d at 742, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
61. McComb, Sullivan, Clark, and Richardson, JJ.
62. The issue of whether the material involved in Busch was in fact obscene was
not reached by the supreme court. Since the appeal was from a judgment sustaining a
demurrer, the court assumed for purposes of its decision that the material was obscene.
546 P.2d at 736-37, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 232-33.
63. 546 P.2d at 743, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 239 (citations omitted). Justice Clark, with
Justice McComb concurring, objected to the court's about-face on this issue in the second
decision and quoted this segment of the first Busch opinion, in full and with citations, in
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In the second Busch opinion, this language was deleted. In its place is,
inter alia, the following:
We are aware of no reported cases authorizing the closing of a
bookstore or theater, even after it has been repeatedly determined judi-
cially in a full adversary hearing that all or substantially all of the maga-
zines or films exhibited or sold therein are obscene. . . .While we have
concluded that a court of equity, having determined particular magazines
or films to be obscene, after a full adversary hearing, may enjoin the
exhibition or sale thereof by those responsible, we emphasize that the
closing of such bookstores or theaters, either temporarily or perma-
nently, or the enjoining of the exhibition or sale on said premises of
magazines or films not specifically determined to be obscene, constitutes
an impermissible prior restraint in violation of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. 4
It is on this issue only-whether a theater or bookstore may be closed
after a civil determination that it is dealing in some obscene materials-that
the first and second Busch decisions differ. In the second decision, Chief
Justice Wright joined the majority opinion and Justice Mosk concurred on
this issue alone. 5 Had the first Busch opinion been allowed to stand, trial
courts would have been free to decide for themselves whether "padlocking"
sanctions were constitutionally permissible. However, under United States
Supreme Court decisions, there seems to be little doubt that sanctions
against a business as a whole that would necessarily remove materials not
found to be obscene from the market would constitute an impermissible
prior restraint.
In Freedman v. Maryland,6" in which a state motion picture censorship
statute was challenged, the Court held that prior restraints are not unconstitu-
tional per se, but that" '[a]ny system of prior restraints of expression comes
to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.'
. . . '[U]nder the Fourteenth Amendment, a State is not free to adopt
whatever procedures it pleases for dealing with obscenity . . .without
regard to the possible consequences for constitutionally protected speech.'
' . . Subsequently, in Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad,68 in
a separate opinion in the report of the final Busch decision. 17 Cal. 3d at 62-63, 550 P.2d
at 612-13, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 340-41.
64. 17 Cal. 3d at 59, 550 P.2d at 610, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
65. The court split 5-2 on the central issue-whether obscenity falls within the
ambit of the general nuisance statutes. However, Justices Clark and McComb dissented on
the blanket injunction issue (see note 63 supra), while Justice Mosk concurred in the
majority decision on this issue. In his brief concurrence on the blanket injunction issue,
Justice Mosk- added that he believed closing bookstores or theaters on public nuisance
grounds would violate the California Constitution, article I, section 2, as well as the First
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 17 Cal. 3d at 62, 550 P.2d
at 612, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 340 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
66. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
67. Id. at 57 (citations omitted).
68. 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
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which a decision by a municipal board to deny the use of a theater for
presentation of the musical "Hair" was challenged, the Court reaffirmed
these circumscriptions, promulgated in Freedman, on any system of prior
restraint:
First, the burden of instituting judicial proceedings, and of proving that
the material is unprotected, must rest on the censor. Second, any restraint
prior to judicial review can be imposed only for a specified brief period
and only for the purpose of preserving the status quo. Third, a prompt
final judicial determination must be assured.69
Were trial courts empowered to issue padlock orders against theaters or
bookstores on the basis of a judicial finding that some of the books or films
being disseminated were obscene, other books or films available in such
theaters or bookstores would be effectively suppressed without the benefit of
a judicial determination as to their obscenity vel non. Such a padlock order
would constitute a prior restraint without the Freedman-Southeastern Prom-
otions safeguards. For all practical purposes, a padlock order would be a
final restraint as to books and films not found to be obscene, but being
disseminated alongside materials that have been held obscene in a Busch
proceeding. 0 In Freedman the Court held: "The teaching of our cases is
69. Id. at 560.
70. In its first Busch opinion, the California Supreme Court cited State ex rel.
Cahalan v. Diversified Theatrical Corp., 59 Mich. App. 223, 229 N.W.2d 389 (1975), in
stating that padlock orders have been held not to constitute prior restraints in some juris-
dictions. That decision, however, was reversed by the Michigan Supreme Court. 396
Mich. 244, 240 N.W.2d 460 (1976). In reversing, the Michigan high court held that the
court of appeals had erroneously endorsed the use of the state's Red Light Abatement
Law against obscenity. This disposition made it unnecessary for the supreme court to
reach the prior restraint question, and it specifically declined to do so. However, the court
noted that "[s]everal state courts, reviewing the use of statutes (other than red light
abatement acts) to enjoin the sale of books or exhibition of films found to be obscene,
have found injunctive remedies unconstitutional when used to suppress materials not
found to be obscene." 396 Mich. at 251 n.15, 240 N.W.2d at 464 n.15. The Michigan
court then quoted this language from Sanders v. State, 231 Ga. 608, 613, 203 S.E.2d
153, 157 (1974): "One obscene book on the premises does not make an entire store
obscene. The injunction closing this store and padlocking it as a public nuisance necessar-
ily halted the future sale and distribution of other printed material which may not be
obscene, thereby precluding the application of the above procedural safeguards and creat-
ing an unconstitutional restraint upon appellant. This broad result cannot be reconciled
with free expression under our Constitutions." 396 Mich. at 251 n.15, 240 N.W.2d at
463-64 n. 15.
In State v. A Motion Picture Entitled "The Bet," 219 Kan. 64, 547 P.2d 760
(1976), the Kansas Supreme Court held a padlock provision in that state's nuisance
abatement statute unconstitutional, quoting from Gulf States Theatres of Louisiana, Inc. v.
Richardson, 287 So. 2d 480, 491-92 (La. 1973): ". . .[U]nder our statute there can be
no expression of any kind-good or bad-emanating either from the premises or from the
devices on the premises for a period of one year. This is the very essence of the prior
restraint condemned by Blackstone, by our Bill of Rights, and by our jurisprudence. Of
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that, because only a judicial determination in an adversary proceeding en-
sures the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression, only a procedure
requiring a judicial determination suffices to impose a valid final re-
straint.""1
Had the California Supreme Court not modified its first Busch opinion,
padlock orders very likely would have issued from some trial courts. By
stating clearly in its second opinion that such orders are constitutionally
impermissible, the court greatly limited the impact of the Busch decision. In
thus modifying its stand on the issue of prior restraint, the court has limited
the application of the Busch injunctive sanctions to specific materials judi-
cially held to be obscene. It is in this context that the first opinion has
warranted mention here.
C. The Busch Dissent
Justice Tobriner's dissent in Busch, with Justice Mosk concurring,
centered on three basic contentions:
1) The legislature did not intend for the general public nuisance statutes
to be used as a vehicle for regulating obscenity;
2) Conduct subject to injunction under the general nuisance statutes
must constitute an assault on the senses (based on his "comma" theory);
and
3) The use of the general nuisance statutes to control obscenity is
particularly obnoxious to First Amendment interests in the absence of a jury
determination, because of the wide diversity of opinion as to what is obscene
and the consequent, unavoidable constitutional infirmities in the realm of
vagueness and overbreadth.
1. Legislative Intent
The deference afforded legislative intent in judicial interpretation of
statutes is exemplified in the Busch majority's treatment of the Red Light
Abatement Law issue." Justice Tdbriner contended, however, that the
majority ignored expressions of legislative intent in its interpretation of the
general nuisance statutes.7 3 He pointed out that in 1974, Assembly Bill
all the constitutional violations on the face of these statutes, the prior restraint imposed
under R.S. 13:4717 is the most offensive.
"This particular section of the Revised Statutes does restrict expression not yet-found
to be an offense and not yet uttered. It is a classic example of prior restraint of speech
and expression and is violative of federal and state constitutions." 219 Kan. at 74, 547
P.2d at 769-70. See also Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971).
71. 380 U.S. at 58.
72. See text accompanying note 51 supra.
73. Justice Tobriner also made the argument that the majority holding in Busch
flies in the face of popular will in that it implements a judicial procedure rejected by the
voters in the 1972 statewide initiative, Proposition 19. 17 Cal. 3d at 70, 550 P.2d at 617,
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4340,14 which would have provided for injunctive action against obscene
material, was defeated by the Assembly Committee on Criminal Justice.75
"Defeated," however, appears to be a misleading choice of terminology.
"Died in committee" would seem to be a better characterization of the
ultimate fate of A.B. 4340. There is no indication in the Assembly Final
History7" that a vote was ever taken on A.B. 4340 at any level. The measure
was "held under submission" in the Criminal Justice Committee and was
still languishing there when the legislature adjourned." The weight that can
be given, in terms of legislative intent, to a six-member Assembly commit-
tee's failure to act on any given measure is slight.
Furthermore, the context in which the injunctive remedy against
obscenity was proposed must be considered. A.B. 4340 would have
changed California obscenity statutes in several respects, including a sub-
stantial modification in the definition of obscene matter" and a provision
imputing knowledge of the contents of any allegedly obscene material to the
distributor thereof after service of process in an injunctive proceeding.79 The
Committee on Criminal Justice may have failed to act on A.B. 4340 for any
number of reasons, including, but by no means limited to, opposition to the
injunctive remedy the bill would have authorized." On balance, this portion
130 Cal. Rptr. at 345 (Tobriner, J., dissenting). However-putting aside the issue of
whether the courts are or should be bound by the "popular will" in this context-Justice
Tobriner failed to mention that the injunctive procedure rejected in the 1972 election was
part of a broad and repressive anti-obscenity measure. While it cannot be said with cer-
tainty that the anti-obscenity injunctive procedure was not a factor in voter rejection of
Proposition 19, it is unlikely that it played a major role in the outcome of the vote. Prop-
osition 19, inter alia, would have totally abolished the "utterly without redeeming social
importance" standard in Penal Code section 311, without putting any alternative "value"
standard in its place. It also would have made the "contemporary standards" by which
challenged material is to be judged, with respect to prurient appeal, local rather than
statewide.
74. A.B. 4340, Cal. Legis., 1973-74 Reg. Sess. (1974).
75. 17 Cal. 3d at 70-71, 550 P.2d at 617-18, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 345-46 (Tobriner,
J., dissenting).
76. CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE, ASSEMBLY FINAL HISTORY 2108 (1974).
77. Id.
78. A.B. 4340 would have changed California's definition of obscenity, in Penal
Code section 311, to comply with the standards of Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973) (see text accompanying note 34 supra). A.B. 4340, Cal. Legis., 1973-74 Reg.
Sess. § 311 (1974).
79. A.B. 4340, Cal. Legis., 1973-74 Reg. Sess. § 311.3(d) (1974).
80. Another bill amending California's obscenity statutes was introduced in the
legislature in 1975. S.B. 886, Cal. Legis., 1975-76 Reg. Sess. (1976). Senate Bill 886
also would have provided, inter alia, for an injunctive remedy against obscene materials.
In fact, under S.B. 886, a civil action on the obscenity issue would have been a pre-
requisite to any criminal proceeding. This measure was passed, 21-3, by the California
Senate, but was turned down by the Assembly Committee on Criminal Justice, the same
committee in which A.B. 4340 met its lingering death. S.B. 886 also would have made a
number of changes in the obscenity statutes in addition to the injunctive proceeding, and,
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of Justice Tobriner's dissent seems relatively weak by comparison with the
thrust of his opinion as a whole.
2. The Comma Theory
Justice Tobriner made another argument in his dissent in Busch that is
somewhat more persuasive, although it relied heavily on the placement of a
single comma in Penal Code section 370.
His contention was that a nuisance, as defined in Civil Code section3479,81 must be indecent or offensive to the senses. This is significant in that
the activity against which an injunction was being sought in Busch was the
exhibition of a motion picture within a theater open only to those willing to
pay admission-a willing audience."2 There was nothing about the theater
itself to offend the five senses as such. Justice Tobriner contended that the
phrase "to the senses" was intended to modify "indecent" as well as
"offensive" in Civil Code section 3479. In making this argument, he con-
trasted Civil Code section 3479 with Penal Code section 370. The latter
statute defines a public nuisance as "[a]nything which is injurious to health,
or is indecent, or offensive to the senses .. "83 The language is identical
to that of Civil Code section 3479,84 but the comma that appears after
"indecent" in the Penal Code section is absent in the Civil Code section.
Justice Tobriner argued that this comma evinced a legislative intent to in-
clude within Penal Code section 370 conduct that is 1) indecent or 2) offen-
sive to the senses-whereas the same phrase in Civil Code section 3479 was
intended to embrace only conduct that is "indecent . to the senses.'85
The Busch majority avoided the comma discrepancy by equating the
definitions in Penal Code section 370 and Civil Code section 34798" and
then relying on the definition in Penal Code section 370 throughout its
opinion. It seems relatively clear, however, that the Busch decision had to
rest on Civil Code sections 3479 and 3480.87 The statutory authority for an
as in the case of A.B. 4340, it is impossible to determine why the Criminal Justice Com-
mittee chose not to pass the bill out for a vote on the Assembly floor. See CALIFORNIA
LEGISLATURE, SENATE FINAL HISTORY 438 (1976).
81. See note 46 supra.
82. See text accompanying notes 53-57 supra.
83. CAL. PENAL CODE § 370 (West Supp. 1977).
84. See note 46 supra.
85. 17 Cal. 3d at'65, 550 P.2d at 614, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 342 (Tobriner, J., dissent-
ing).
86. "We . . . note preliminarily the substantial identity of definitions appearing in
Penal Code sections 370 and 371, and Civil Code sections 3479 and 3480, taken in con-
junction." 17 Cal. 3d at 49, 550 P.2d at 603, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 331.
87. If the majority had believed that an abatement action would lie solely on the
basis of Penal Code section 370, in the absence of statutory authority for the remedy it-
self, surely it would not have invited the comma dispute by including references to Civil
Code sections 3479 and 3480 in its opinion. On the issue of civil actions brought by pub-
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abatement action brought by a district attorney or city attorney is found in
Code of Civil Procedure section 731,8 which, as Justice Tobriner pointed
out, refers specifically to Civil Code sections 3479 and 3480.9 There is no
statutory authority for an abatement action under Penal Code section 370,
which, given its context, would appear to pertain only to criminal prosecu-
tions."
3. Vagueness and the Jury's Role
The vice of vagueness has already been discussed.9 As Justice Tob-
riner pointed out, "the concept of obscenity is an inherently vague one, and
no legislative or judicial efforts that even arguably comport with the First
Amendment could define the term with sufficient precision to enable
businesspersons confidently to determine whether their products or exhibi-
tions would be ruled obscene."'" Justice Tobriner reached this conclusion
on the following grounds:
The problem of defining obscenity is intractable -because we have no
community view of that which appeals to the prurient interest and lacks
social value, but rather a host of distinct views within each community.
And even if these distinct views could be said metaphysically to coalesce
to form some community standard, no trier of fact could confidently
ascertain what that standard was.93
Furthermore, the vagueness infirmity inherent in regulation of obscen-
ity was compounded, in Justice Tobriner's view, by the importation of
obscenity doctrine into public nuisance proceedings.
In a public nuisance proceeding, however, no jury is impanelled to
determine whether a particular work is obscene under contemporary
lie officials in the absence of statutory authority, see Safer v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d
230, 540 P.2d 14, 124 Cal. Rptr. 174 (1975).
88. "A civil action may be brought in the name of the people of the State of Cali-
fornia to abate a public nuisance, as the same is defined in section thirty-four hundred and
eighty of the Civil Code, by the district attorney of any county in which such nuisance
exists, or by the city attorney of any town or city in which such nuisance exists, and each
of said officers shall have concurrent right to bring such action for a public nuisance exist-
ing within a town or city, and such district attorney, or city attorney, of any county or
city in which such nuisance exists must bring such action whenever directed by the board
of supervisors of such county or whenever directed by the legislative authority of such
town or city." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 731 (West 1955).
89. 17 Cal. 3d at 64-65, 550 P.2d at 614, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 342 (Tobriner, J.,
dissenting).
90. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 372, 373a (West 1970).
91. See notes 19-44 and accompanying text supra.
92. 17 Cal. 3d at 72, 550 P.2d at 619, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 347 (Tobriner, J., dissent-
ing). Accord, Bloom v. Municipal Court, 16 Cal. 3d 71, 86-91, 545 P.2d 229, 239-42,
127 Cal. Rptr. 317, 327-30 (1976) (Tobriner, J., dissenting). See also id. at 84-86, 545
P.2d at 37-38, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 325-26 (Wright, C.J., concurring).
93. 17 Cal. 3d at 72, 550 P.2d at 619, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 347 (Tobriner, J., dissent-
Spring 1977]
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
community standards; that crucial determination-upon which the cen-
sorship of a book, a magazine, a play or a motion picture turns-is left
instead to a single judicial officer. In a criminal obscenity proceeding,
the requirement that a jury be drawn from a cross-section of the commun-
ity will normally provide at least some promise that the varying tastes
and sensibilities that exist in every community will play some role in the
determination of whether a work is obscene or not. By authorizing a
single judge--distant to the interplay of the diverse cultural, religious,
intellectual and economic backgrounds commonly present in a jury
room-to make the determination of obscenity on the basis of an undeni-
ably subjective standard, the majority inevitably confines constitutional
protection only to those works that, in the personal view of a singlejudge, are not offensive.94
Thus, Justice Tobriner concluded that the Busch majority's interpreta-
tion of California's general public nuisance statutes contravenes the First
Amendment because of the chilling effect on protected expression. Justice
Tobriner' s analysis of the jury role in obscenity proceedings is probing and
incisive. There is one aspect of the issue, however, with which le did not
deal.
D. Obscenity Vel Non: Who Should Decide?
1. Jail Without a Jury?
If an obscenity prosecution is brought under California Penal Code
section 372, defendants are constitutionally entitled to a jury trial.9" How-
ever, in a public nuisance action such as that endorsed by the Busch major-
ity, there is no jury trial right,96 since defendants do not face incarceration in
such a proceeding. However, if defendants violated a Busch injunction-
issued after a single judge's determination, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, that certain materials were obscene and therefore constituted a public
nuisance-they would be subject to prosecution for contempt of court, a
misdemeanor under California Penal Code section 166.", And it is unlikely,
though there is some doubt, that defendants charged with contempt for
94. Id. at 73, 550 P.2d at 619-20, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 347-48 (Tobriner, J., dissent-
ing).
95. CAL. PEN. CODE § 372 (West 1970); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16; Ex parte
Wong You Ting, 106 Cal. 296, 39 P. 627 (1895).
96. An advisory jury may be impanelled in an equity proceeding, but its verdict is
not binding on the judge. CAL. RULES OF COURT, Rules 231, 519 (West 1977).
97. There also is provision for contempt proceedings in the California Code of
Civil Procedure, section 1209 (West Supp. 1977) and sections 1210-22 (West 1972).
Under this scheme there is no right to jury trial; however, punishment is limited to a
maximum of five days in jail and a $500 fine. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1218 (West
1972). For a discussion of contempt proceedings under the Code of Civil Procedure,
focusing on the extent of procedural safeguards, see Arthur v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. 2d
404, 398 P.2d 777, 42 Cal. Rptr. 441 (1965). See also Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S.
212 (1971); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (196&8.
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violation of a Busch injunction would be entitled to a de novo jury determi-
nation on the issue of obscenity vel non.
In most jurisdictions the obscenity issue would be foreclosed by the
collateral bar rule,98 under which defendants in contempt proceedings are
not allowed to challenge the validity of the underlying injunction.99 The
traditional exception to this rule is that court orders issued in excess of
jurisdiction are open to collateral attack.1"' This is, however, an exception
that has been narrowly circumscribed in most jurisdictions, for the simple
reason that courts cannot effectively grant equitable relief if they are unable
to enforce their own decrees.' On the other hand, some courts have treated
infirmities in challenged orders as jurisdictional rather than deeming the
orders merely erroneous because relief otherwise could not be afforded short
of extraordinary remedies.' In California, court orders have been held to
have been issued in excess of jurisdiction on constitutional grounds of over-
breadth0 3 and lack of notice.' In fact, the California courts have defined
"in excess of jurisdiction" so broadly that it has been said they have re-
jected the collateral bar rule entirely.' Nonetheless, it is apparent that in
some instances injunctions are beyond collateral attack even in California.0 6
98. See Note, Gag Orders on the Press, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 187 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Gag Orders].
99. Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967); United States v. United Mine
Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
100. See Cox, The Void Order and the Duty to Obey, 16 U. CHI. L. REV. 86,
86-87 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Cox].
101. See Tefft, Neither Above the Law Nor Below It, 1967 Sup. CT. REV. 181,
190-92.
102. See Cox, supra note 100, at 98.
103. In re Berry, 68 Cal. 2d 137, 436 P.2d 273, 65 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1968).
104. United Farm Workers v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 3d 902, 537 P.2d 1237, 122
Cal. Rptr. 877 (1975). In Berry, the California Supreme Court attempted to reconcile its
decision with the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Walker (see note 99 and accompany-
ing text supra). 68 Cal. 2d at 150, 436 P.2d at 282, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 282. But its opinion
in United Farm Workers made it clear that the Berry holding and the Walker opinion were
essentially incompatible: "[T]he United States Supreme Court . . . announced in Walker
v. City of Birmingham . . . that persons seeking to challenge the constitutional validity of
an ex parte injunction must seek judicial redress before contemplating disobedience of the
order. But the rule in California is otherwise. In this state a person affected by an injunc-
tive order which exceeds the jurisdiction of the issuing court has the choice of complying
with the order and bringing a judicial challenge, or disobeying it and subsequently attack-
ing its validity when he is charged with contempt." 14 Cal. 3d at 907 n.3, 537 P.2d at
1240 n.3, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 880 n.3 (citations omitted).
105. Gag Orders, supra note 98, at 204:
106. See, e.g., Signal Oil and Gas Co., 49 Cal. 2d 764, 322 P.2d 1 (1958) ap-
proved in In re Berry, 68 Cal. 2d at 147-48, 436 P.2d at 280-81, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 280-
81.
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It is not entirely clear, then, whether a Busch injunction, which nor-
mally would be subject neither to overbreadth nor to lack of notice chal-
lenges, Would be subject to collateral attack during contempt proceedings."' 7
However, if a Busch injunction were subject to such attack, it would lose
much of its vitality as a means of obscenity regulation. Hung juries are
relatively common in criminal obscenity prosecutions,"" and a losing de-
fendant in a Busch action might well be inclined to ignore the ensuing
injunction if he or she were allowed to relitigate the obscenity issue before a
jury in contempt proceedings. On the other hand, if the issue of obscenity
vel non were not subject to relitigation during contempt proceedings, a
defendant in a public nuisance obscenity action could face incarceration, via
subsequent contempt proceedings, for the "crime" of violating a single
judge's sense of decency.
2. The United States Supreme Court and the Jury Issue
In Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,1"9 the Court expressed a strong
preference for criminal prosecutions as the proper mode of determining
whether materials are obscene-specifically because the criminal trial is so
"hedged about" with procedural safeguards."' In Kingsley Books, Inc. v.
Brown,"' Justice Brennan, dissenting, believed that "the absence in this
New York obscenity statute of a right to jury trial is a fatal defect."" ' He
went on to say:
The jury represents a cross-section of the community and has a
special aptitude for reflecting the view of the average person. Jury trial of
obscenity therefore provides a peculiarly competent application of the
standard for judging obscenity which, by its definition, calls for an
appraisal of material according to the average person's application of
contemporary community standards. A statute which does not afford the
defendant, of right, a jury determination of obscenity falls short, in my
view, of giving proper effect to the standard fashioned as the necessary
safeguard demanded by the freedoms of speech and press for material
which is not obscene." 3
107. See Maita v. Whitmore, 365 F. Supp. 1331 (N.D. Cal. 1973), rev'd on other
grounds, 508 F.2d 143 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 947 (1975). In Maita, the
district court held that an injunction issued under the Red Light Abatement Law was not
subject to collateral attack during contempt proceedings. However, defendants in the con-
tempt proceedings had appealed the underlying order prior to the contempt prosecution,
and this factor could account for the court's refusal to countenance subsequent collateral
attack.
108. See, e.g., THE SAN FRANCISCO COMMITTEE ON CRIME, A REPORT ON
NON-VICTIM CRIME IN SAN FRANcIscO 56 (June 1971); Lockhart, supra note 29, at
535 n. 14.
109. 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
110. Id. at 69-70.
111. 354 U.S. 436 (1957) (upholding a New York statute authorizing injunctive re-
lief against obscene materials).
112. Id. at 447 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 448. Accord, McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669, 683-89 (1976)
(separate opinion of Brennan, J.).
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This view, however, has never been shared by a majority of the Court.
In Alexander v. Virginia,"' the Court held, in a two-page per curiam opin-
ion, that a jiry trial was not constitutionally required-at least not in that
particular state civil proceeding and under the particular statute there in-
volved." 5 Whether this holding can be extended to cover all state civil
proceedings against obscenity, regardless of the statute involved, is not
entirely clear." 6 Alexander was decided only four days after Miller and
Paris Adult Theatre. There was some confusion, in the immediate wake of
the latter two decisions, as to how trial courts were to define the "commun-
ity" by whose "contemporary standards" allegedly obscene materials were
to be judged."' A year later, however, the Supreme Court confronted this
issue head-on in Hamling v. United States."' In that case petitioners con-
tended that they had been convicted under federal obscenity statutes by a
jury improperly instructed with respect to the "community" by whose stan-
dards the materials in question were to be judged. In holding that the trial
court need not define the community to be used as a gauge, the Court stated:
A juror is entitled to draw on his own knowledge of the views of the
average person in the community or vicinage from which he comes for
making the required determination, just as he is entitled to draw on his
knowledge of the propensities of a "reasonable" person in other areas of
the law ...
Our analysis in Miller of the difficulty in formulating uniform na-
tional standards of obscenity, and our emphasis on the ability of the juror
to ascertain the sense of the "average person, applying contemporary
community standards" without the benefit of expert evidence, clearly
indicates that 18 U.S.C. § 1461 is not to be interpreted as requiring proof
of the uniform national standards which were criticized in Miller.'
In thus refusing to define "community," the Supreme Court has relied
on the ability of jurors to define that term for themselves. Implicit in this
holding is a recognition that jurors, since they theoretically represent a
cross-section of the community in which the determination is being made,
are best able to ascertain whether challenged materials offend "contempo-
rary community standards." To deprive the defendant in an obscenity action
of the broad social, political, economic, geographic, and educational'ex-
perience of a jury is to define the community more narrowly than seems
appropriate under the language of Hamling.
A judge, of course, is not oblivious to the standards of the community
in which he lives. But a judge is necessarily limited in his ability to assess
community standards by his experience in that community and by the size of
114. 413 U.S. 836 (1973).
115. "A trial by jury is not constitutionally required in this state civil proceeding
pursuant to § 18.1-236.3 of the Code of Virginia, 1950, as amended." Id. at 836.
116. Note, Defects in Indiana's Pornographic Nuisance Act, 49 IND. L.J. 320,
327-28 (1974).
117. See Lockhart, supra note 29, at 549.
118. 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
119. Id. at 104-05.
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the vicinage with which he is familiar. In Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Re-
gents, 2 ' Justice Black, concurring, pointed out that "judges possess no
special expertise providing exceptional competency to set standards and to
supervise the private morals of the Nation.'"'12 He went on to express the
opinion, borne out by the post-Memoirs line of cases, 2 that the Supreme
Court was being called upon to "appraise each movie on a case-by-case
basis," which inevitably leads to each justice exercising "'his own judgment
as to how bad a picture is, a judgment which is ultimately based at least in
large part on his own standard of what is immoral.' '123
This raises obvious uncertainty problems. Given the subjective moral-
ity element of such a decision, who can predict, in the case of borderline
materials, whether a judge will find any particular book or movie obscene in
any given case?124 This is not to impugn the integrity of California's trial
judges, but merely to point out how elusive and individualized judgments on
such matters as "prurient interest" and "patent offensiveness" can be.'25
120. 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
121. Id. at 690 (Black, J., concurring).
122. See text accompanying notes 30-32 supra.
123. 360 U.S. at 690-91 (Black, J., concurring).
124. E.g., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
It could be argued in response that a jury's decision is also extremely difficult to predict.
As long as obscenity litigation is allowed to continue, however, someone or somebody
must make the initial determination at trial as to whether given material is obscene. In
view of the majoritarian nature of the "contemporary community standards" criterion, a
jury is at least more likely to reach a conclusion that reflects its peers' attitudes with re-
spect to "prurient appeal" and "patent offensiveness" than is a single judge. Further-
more, a jury trial provides for counterchecks on the "social value" factor (see notes
25-36 and accompanying text supra) not available in a non-jury proceeding. If a judge
finds that materials are not obscene, the case need never go to the jury. People v. Harris,
192 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 887, 894, 13 Cal. Rptr. 642, 647 (1961). If the judge decides
otherwise, the jury serves as a First Amendment backstop to ensure that protected expres-
sion does not fall victim to the moral sensibilities of a jurist less concerned with free
speech interests than with protecting the masses from presumptively corrupting influences.
125. In oral arguments before the Court in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S.
413 (1966), the following colloquy took place between Justice Black and the attorney ar-
guing that the book was obscene:
MR. JUSTICE BLACK: I'd like to ask you a question now about findings of
the [trial] court. How many judges do they have?
MR. COWIN: On Superior Court, your Honor, there are in excess of forty.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK: How many do you know?
MR. COWIN: I know perhaps half of them.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK: Do you think we could reasonably expect to get the
same kind of finding from all forty judges?
MR. COWIN: Not a chance.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK: Why?
MR. COWIN: Because the reactions to the material would simply be too dif-
ferent.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK: Reactions of the person, individual person?
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Commentators have pointed out that First Amendment interests some-
times are better protected in a single-judge proceeding than in a jury trial.126
A judge mindful of the finely drawn line between "speech unconditionally
guaranteed and speech which may legitimately be regulated'"'17 might find a
book or movie to be protected by the First Amendment in a case in which a
jury less concerned with civil liberties would find the same material
obscene. But this is hardly reason to prefer a judge's decision over a jury
determination in every case. Expression is presumptively protected by the
First Amendment and maintains that status until a judicial determination to
the contrary is made.12" This is one of the precepts that have led the Supreme
Court to refer on occasion to expression as having a "preferred" position.12 9
It seems to follow, then, that a defendant in an obscenity proceeding should
have the option of being tried before a judge or jury-in the interest of
providing First Amendment freedoms with the most stringent of procedural
safeguards.
I. Balancing and the Scales of Nuisance Law
A. The Harm
Under the Roth-Memoirs-Miller exclusion-by-definition approach, it
was not, of course, necessary for the California Supreme Court to identify,
in Busch, the state interest to be protected by obscenity controls per se.
However, a balancing of interests enters the picture again when those con-
trols take the form of nuisance abatement. Dean Prosser pointed out that an
interference with a protected interest "must not only be substantial, but it
must also be unreasonable" to constitute a nuisance.13° Before a determina-
MR. COWIN: Yes, your Honor.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK: Then how can we rely, how can we adopt a test that
makes us rely on the findings of judges when we know there are likely to be
no two of them alike?
MR. COWIN: We cannot rely on the findings, your Honor. That I agree with.
If it's a question, we'll rely on the United States Supreme Court to be the
final determining factor of whether or not the tests have been met. I say we
have to. This is the court of last resort.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK: Well, you're right. But the problem still arises how
the Court is going to do all this censorship and do anything else.
MR. COWIN: I agree.
REMBAR, supra note 20, at 464.
126. See, e.g., Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARv. L. REv.
518, 526-32 (1970). Professor Monaghan argues that juries cannot be expected to be sen-
sitive to First Amendment interests in every instance and that judges are less inclined to
be affected by passion and prejudice.
127. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958).
128. Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 503-05 (1973).
129. E.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945).
130. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 580 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
PROSSER].
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tion of nuisance vel non can be made, the court must balance the interests of
plaintiff and defendant. 1
3 1
The very existence of organized society depends upon the principle of
"gi.e and take, live and let live," and therefore the law of torts does not
attempt to impose liability or shift the loss in every case where one
person's conduct has some detrimental effect on another. Liability is
imposed only in those cases where the harm or risk to one is greater than
he ought to be required to bear under the circumstances, at least without
compensation."'
Thus it becomes necessary, in applying nuisance law to obscenity, to
confront the question evaded in the First Amendment context via the
exclusion-by-definition approach: What is the harm in obscenity? Or, more
specifically addressing the Busch situation: How can obscenity behind
closed doors constitute such a substantial and unreasonable interference with
a protected interest that it should be subject to abatement as a public nui-
sance?
A public nuisance in California is "one which affects at the same time
an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable number of per-
sons, although the extent of the annoyance or damage inflicted upon indi-
viduals may be unequal.' 13 3 The annoyance or damage sought to be en-
joined in Busch clearly was not sensory in nature. 34 Rather, as the majority
pointed out, the injury inflicted upon the public was an offense against "a
community's moral sensibilities."" ' 5 Quoting a 1916 court of appeal deci-
sion, Weis v. Superior Court,"6 the Busch majority stated that " 'any act
which is an offense against public decency, or any public exhibition which is
offensive to the senses, whether of sight, sound, or smell, or which tends to
corrupt public morals or disturb the good order and welfare of society, is a
public nuisance.' ,,"3' The California Supreme Court thus has recognized
131. Id. at 580-81. Prosser points out that "[c]ertain public nuisances are desig-
nated specifically by statute. Within constitutional limitations, the declaration of the
legislature is conclusive, and will preclude any inquiry into their unreasonable character."
Id. at 583. However, with respect to a Busch public nuisance, it would be greatly stretch-
ing the scope of "specific designation" to contend that the legislature, by including the
term "indecent" in Civil Code section 3479, intended to foreclose inquiry into the harm
inherent in any assertedly indecent conduct or material.
132. Id. at 580.
133. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3480 (West 1970).
134. See text accompanying note 57 supra.
135. 17 Cal. 3d at 51, 550 P.2d at 604-05, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 332-33. A word of
caution is in order here. The United States Supreme Court has held that a state may not
constitutionally proscribe allegedly obscene material only because it is repugnant to the
"moral standards, the religious precepts and the legal code of its citizenry." Kingsley
Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 688-89 (1959). Immoral expression can, of
course, be suppressed if it is found to be obscene. But it cannot be found obscene merely
because it is immoral.
136. 30 Cal. App. 730, 159 P. 464 (1916).
137. 17 Cal. 3d at 51, 550 P.2d at 605, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 333.
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morality as an interest of the community deserving protection under the
state's general nuisance law. And in Busch it has concluded, as the United
States Supreme Court has held a state may,'38 that obscenity tends to cor-
rupt.'39 Some may take issue with this characterization of theBusch holding,
for the Busch majority purported to discover a mode of proceeding against
obscenity that had lain dormant in California's general nuisance statutes for
years. However, in the interest of facilitating analysis, it is more realistic to
recognize that the court has, in fact, read obscenity into Civil Code section
3479, via Penal Code section 370.
In expanding upon the interest being protected in Busch, the majority
quoted balancing language from People v. Luros:1
41
138. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49 (1973). In Paris Adult Theatre, Chief Justice Burger addressed the issue of the
state's interest in regulating obscenity in these terms: "In particular, we hold that there
are legitimate state interests at stake in stemming the tide of commercialized obscenity,
even assuming it is feasible to enforce effective safeguards against exposure to juyVeniles
and to passersby. . . . These include the interest of the public in the quality of life and
the total community environment, the tone of commerce in the great city centers, and,
possibly, the public safety itself." 413 U.S. at 57-58. The Court's language in Miller and
Paris Adult Theatre I led some to conclude that the Court had covertly adopted a balanc-
ing approach to obscenity in general. See, e.g., Note, The Speech and Press Clause of the
First Amendment as Ordinary Language, 87 HARV. L. REV. 374, 378-79 n.27 (1973).
Subsequent decisions made it clear, however, that the exclusion-by-definition approach
has not in any sense been abandoned. Thus, Chief Justice Burger's discussion with re-
spect to the state's interest is the purest of dicta in the First Amendment context, with the
ultimate question before the courts continuing to be whether material is obscene by defini-
tion, not whether it is injurious. However, Chief Justice Burger's language becomes more
significant when viewed in the context of the public nuisance action, in that it can be
construed as a recognition of legitimate interests that the state may wish to protect through
its nuisance statutes.
139. The courts have long referred to the presumed tendency of obscenity to de-
prave and corrupt. In his concurring opinion in Roth, Chief Justice Warren noted that
obscenity had been construed by the California courts to mean "having a substantial ten-
dency to corrupt by arousing lustful desires." 354 U.S. at 494 (Warren, C.J., concur-
ring). However, in 1970, the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography, after extensive
investigation of this presumption, reported: "Research to date thus provides no substantial
basis for the belief that erotic materials constitute a primary or significant cause of the
development of character deficits or that they operate as a significant determinative factor
in causing crime and delinquency." COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY,
THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY 243 (1970).
Furthermore, the commission noted that: "On the positive side, explicit sexual materials
are sought as a source of entertainment and information by substantial numbers of Ameri-
can adults. At times, these materials also appear to serve to increase and facilitate con-
structive communication about sexual matters within marriage." Id. at 53. Nonetheless,
the majority in Paris Adult Theatre I held that it is reasonable for a state legislature to
determine that adverse effects do flow from obscenity, asserting that "[f]rom the begin-
ning of civilized societies, legislators and judges have acted on various unprovable as-
sumptions." 413 U.S. at 61.
140. 4 Cal. 3d 84, 480 P.2d 633, 92 Cal. Rptr. 833 (1971). This was a criminal
obscenity prosecution under California Penal Code § 311.2 (West Supp. 1977).
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[I]n the context of public distribution of obscenity, the balance of inter-
ests upholds the constitutionality of state regulation, even though that
regulation imposes some burdens upon the exercise of constitutional
rights. . . .States retain broad power to regulate obscenity and regula-
tion of the public distribution of obscenity falls well wxithin the broad
scope of that power.' 4 '
B. Usurping the Legislative Role
Apparently, then, the Busch majority has accepted the propositions that
1) obscenity tends to corrupt public morals, 2) the state's interest in preserv-
ing current moral precepts is sufficient to override any First Amendment
objections that may be raised to definitional suppression of obscenity, and 3)
the interest in preserving current moral precepts is sufficient to invoke the
extraordinary remedy of a public nuisance action, despite the absence of any
mention of obscenity in California's general nuisance statutes.
The last of these propositions contravenes People v. Lim,14 which was
cited in Busch both by the majority and by Justice Tobriner, dissenting. 14 3 In
Lim, the district attorney of Monterey County brought a public nuisance
action to restrain defendants from operating a gambling establishment. The
court held that gambling could not be enjoined as a public nuisance per se in
the absence of legislative authorization."' In Lim, however, the district
attorney's complaint alleged that the gambling establishment at issue
"draws together great numbers of disorderly persons, disturbs the public
peace, brings together idle persons and cultivates dissolute habits among
them, creates traffic and fire hazards, and is thereby injurious to health,
indecent and offensive to the senses and impairs the free enjoyment of life
and property."' 45
The issue before the court in Lim was whether the trial court had
properly sustained general and special demurrers to the complaint. The court
held that the complaint was sufficient as against the demurrers, but only
because "[c]rowds of disorderly people who disturb the peace and obstruct
the traffic may well impair the free enjoyment of life and property and give
rise to the hazards designated in the statute" 4 -- not because gambling
could be characterized as a nuisance per se.
141. 17 Cal. 3d at 52, 550 P.2d at 605, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 333.
142. 18 Cal. 2d 872, 118 P.2d 472 (1941).
143. The majority cited Lim for its mention of Weis v. Superior Court, 30 Cal.
App. 730, 159 P. 464 (1916) (see text accompanying note 136 supra). Justice Tobriner,
on the other hand, cited Lim for its holding that "the responsibility for establishing those
standards of public morality, the violations of which are to constitute public nuisances
within the [sic] equity's jurisdiction, should be left with the Legislature." 17 Cal. 3d at
63-64, 550 P.2d at 613, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 341 (Tobriner, J., dissenting).
144. 18 Cal. 2d at 878-80, 118 P.2d at 475-76.
145. Id. at 882, 118 P.2d at477.
146. Id.
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In Lim, the court noted that "the authorities are divided as to whether
the expansion of the field of public nuisances in which equity will grant
injunctions must be accomplished by an act of the legislature." 4 ' The court
then came down squarely on the side of requiring legislative action:
We think the proper rule, therefore, and the one to which this state is
committed is expressed in the following language from State v. Ehrlick
:14 "It is also competent for the Legislature, within the constitu-
tional limits of its powers, to declare any act criminal and make the
repetition or continuance thereof a public nuisance. . . or to vest in the
courts of equity the power to abate them by injunction; but it is not the
province of th. courts to ordain such jurisdiction for themselves.'149
The court went on to say that, specifically with regard to "standards of
public morality, the violations of which are to constitute public nuisances
within equity's jurisdiction," 5 ' the legislature should bear the responsibility
for establishing those standards. Referring to the elusive character of the
concept of nuisance, the court said: "In a field where the meaning of terms
is so vague and uncertain it is a proper function of the legislature to define
those breaches of public policy which are to be considered public nuisances
within the control of equity.'
15 1
The dangers of vagueness and uncertainty recognized by the court in
Lim did not, however, seem to concern the Busch majority greatly. Citing
Lim for its mention of Weis as an example of activity. 2 that had been
deemed "indecent" under the nuisance statutes and discerning "no satisfac-
tory distinction which would justify differential treatment of the pictorial
representations in obscene magazines and films on the one hand, and 'live'
performances on the other," 153 the majority carved out a new action against
obscenity-stacking one area of the law deeply tangled in vagueness dilem-
mas upon another equally enmeshed in uncertainty. In so doing, it has at
best ignored the spirit ofLim; at worst, it has overruledLim while purporting
to follow it. Dean Prosser wrote: "There is perhaps no more impenetrable
jungle in the entire law than that which surrounds the word 'nuisance.' 11154
In Busch, the California Supreme Court added yet another thicket to that
jungle.
147. Id. at 878, 118 P.2d at 475.
148. 65 W. Va. 700, 64 S.E. 935 (1909).
149. Id. at 879, 118 P.2d at 476.
150. Id. at 879-80, 118 P.2d at 476.
151. Id. at 880, 118 P.2d at 476.
152. Weis involved an exhibit at the 1915 Panama-California International Exposi-
tion in which women were performing nude. 30 Cal. App. at 731, 159 P. at 464.
153. 17 Cal. 3d at 50, 550 P.2d at 604, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 332.
154. PROSSER, supra note 130, at 571.
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IV. The Potential Scope of Busch
A. The Immediate Danger
Realistically, it is unlikely that the California Supreme Court's expan-
sion of the term "indecent" in Civil Code section 3479 will result in a
torrent of public nuisance obscenity litigation. However, the potential for a
sharp increase in such actions cannot be denied. Under California Code of
Civil Procedure section 731, "such district attorney, or city attorney, of any
county or -city in which such nuisance exists must bring such action
whenever directed by the board of supervisors of such county or whenever
directed by the legislative authority of such town or city.''155 Boards of
supervisors and city councils are unlikely, depending on personal inclina-
tions and extent of legal training, to be as attuned to the constitutional
aspects of obscenity litigation as district attorneys and city attorneys. Fur-
thermore, supervisors and council members are directly accountable to con-
stituencies that may not have the vaguest notion of the constitutional in-
tricacies involved in the law of obscenity. And a vociferous, morally out-
raged minority can exert extremely influential pressure on boards of super-
visors and city councils, especially on a subject as emotionally volatile as
obscenity.
In the case of direction from the board of supervisors or the legislative
authority of a town or city, the language of Code of Civil Procedure section
731 is imperative: "[S]uch district attorney, or city attorney, . . . must
bring such action. . .,.56 Prosecutorial discretion serves as a welcome
buffer in the realm of obscenity regulation. For a variety of reasons, ranging
from economic realities to ethical principles, prosecutors probably will not
bring many Busch actions. But if and when the voters discover that their
representatives on boards of supervisors and city councils have the authority
to force litigation against allegedly obscene materials, the prosecutorial
discretion buffer will lose its vitality-and the result could, in fact, be a
deluge of Busch actions.
When the Busch decision came down, there was some concern in the
prosecutorial community about the prospect of city attorneys bringing Busch
actions'57 A number of city attorneys since have agreed not to bring Busch
actions without first conferring with district attorneys. ' However, these are
informal agreements, and the statutory authority of Code of Civil Procedure
section 731 is unaffected.
B. The Private Action Danger
There is another danger inherent in the Busch decision, which arises
from a logical extension of the majority's reasoning. Now that public moral-
155. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 731 (West 1955).
156. Id.
157. Interview with Al Knudson, California deputy attorney general, in San Fran-
cisco (Feb. 3, 1977).
158. Id.
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ity has been recognized as a legitimate interest deserving the protection of
California's nuisance statutes,' 59 zealous private citizens concerned about
declining morality might seek to bring nuisance actions themselves. An
action against an activity that constitutes a public nuisance may be brought
by a private citizen in either of two ways. A private citizen may have
standing to bring a public nuisance action if he or she can show particular or
special injury different in kind from that of the general public;.6 or an
individual may bring a nuisance action if the activity complained of can be
characterized as both a public and a private nuisance.'
The first of these courses was attempted in the case that was overruled
in part in Busch, Harmer v. Tonylyn Productions, Inc. 6 ' In Tonylyn, six
individuals sought to enjoin the exhibition, in a closed theater, of an al-
legedly obscene motion picture. The action was brought under the general
public nuisance statutes and the Red Light Abatement Law. The court of
appeal, in a three-page opinion, held that a film shown in a closed theater
could not be characterized as a public nuisance under Civil Code section
3479163 and added, without explanation, that plaintiffs lpd not alleged the
special injury required to confer standing upon them. It also held that the
Red Light Abatement Law was not applicable to obscenity per se. The
Busch majority specifically disapproved the first of these three holdings and
endorsed the third.' 64 The question of standing for a private citizen was not
considered in Busch.
1. Damage Different in Kind
Dean Prosser's characterization of the law of nuisance as a jungle'65 is
borne out by a perusal of California case law. The reasoning of the various
decisions, and often the holdings themselves, can be extremely difficult, if
not impossible, to reconcile.' It is unclear exactly what sort of special
159. See text accompanying notes 57 & 134-139 supra.
160. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3493 (West 1970).
161. Venuto v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 22 Cal. App. 3d 116, 124, 99
Cal. Rptr. 350, 355 (1971); PROSSER, supra note 130, at 586-91.
162. 23 Cal. App.'3d 941, 100 Cal. Rptr. 576 (1972).
163. See text accompanying note 54 supra.
164. See text accompanying notes 49-57 supra.
165. See text accompanying note 153 supra.
166. Compare Johnson v. V. D. Reduction Co., 175 Cal. 63, 164 P. 1119 (1917)
with Donahue v. Stockton Gas and Elec. Co., 6 Cal. App. 276, 92 P. 196 (1907). In the
former case, a hogyard from which odor and stench emanated was held to be a public
nuisance abatable by a private citizen because he was specially injured in that he lived
less than a mile from the hogyard. In the latter, the court specifically held that plaintiff's
action would not lie by reason of pollution of the atmosphere suffered in common by a
large part of the community, even though plaintiffs property was adjacent to defendant's
plant, but that plaintiff did have standing by reason of direct damage (poisoning of soil
and water) to his land. Also, compare Wade v. Campbell, 200 Cal. App. 2d 54, 19 Cal.
Rptr. 173 (1962) with Fisher v. Zumwalt, 128 Cal. 493, 61 P. 82 (1900). In the former
case, the court held: "While the conditions [a dairy emitting noxious odors and excessive
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injury would have to be alleged by a private citizen seeking standing to bring
a public nuisance action under Busch. It is certain, however, that such
standing need not be predicated on an interference with a property right.'
The nature of the injury to be alleged would seem logically to be that
recognized in Busch itself; that is, injury to the interest in preserving moral
standards. There are a number of ways in which private plaintiffs might
allege that they are suffering injury, in this context, special to themselves.
If, for example, plaintiffs' children have only one playground on which to
expend their youthful energies, its proximity to an adult bookstore might
provide the basis for an allegation of special injury. Given the court's
recognition in Busch of the supposed corrupting influence of obscene mate-
rials, even in the absence of direct exposure to those materials, parents
might allege that the very presence of an adult bookstore is injurious to their
children-and thus an interference with their child-rearing rights and duties.
Furthermore, parents faced with the dilemma of keeping their children
cooped up in an apartment or allowing them to be exposed to the corrupting
emanations from such a bookstore might allege that they are being subjected
to constant mental strain, perhaps even involving physiological repercus-
sions. Countless similar allegations could be framed by an imaginative
litigant. It seems arguable, in fact, that the mere proximity of a plaintiffs
residence to an alleged public nuisance might, in itself, constitute sufficient
special injury to give him or her standing in a Busch action.'68
2. The Private Nuisance Approach
Private actions under the Busch rationale, however, need not necessar-
ily be limited to instances in which special injury can be alleged. If a
plaintiff can show that a public nuisance is also a private nuisance as to him
or her, the action will lie despite the absence of damage different in kind
dust, the operation of which resulted in large fly and mosquito populations in the area]
created and maintained by defendants on their property are sufficient to constitute a con-
tinuing and public nuisance affecting a considerable number of persons in the community,
the plaintiffs, as near residents and property owners, were specially injured thereby." 200
Cal. App. 2d at 60, 19 Cal. Rptr. at 176-77. In the latter case, the court held that plain-
tiff could maintain a nuisance action even though he could show no special damage dif-
ferent in kind from the public generally because the public nuisance complained of was
also a private nuisance as to him. The court apparently rested its holding on this ground
because plaintiff was unable to show special damage despite the fact that he lived "nearer
[to a creamery emitting vile and noxious odors and gases] than any other resident of the
neighborhood." 128 Cal. at 495, 61 P. at 82.
167. Venuto v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 22 Cal. App. 3d 116, 124-125, 99
Cal. Rptr. 350, 356 (1971).
168. See note 165 supra. Cf. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50
(1976) (upholding municipal zoning controls on location of adult entertainment as being
reasonable time, place and manner restrictions; denied theater owners' standing to assert
vagueness and overbreadth attacks).
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from that of the general public.' 69 In order to establish the existence of a
private nuisance, plaintiff must allege an interference with an "interest
sufficient to be dignified as a property right." '
Furthermore, to state a valid cause of action in private nuisance, plain-
tiff must allege a substantial and unreasonable interference with the use and
enjoyment of land-that is, with the interest claimed in the land.' This
interference need not, however, involve direct damage to the land.'
Among the cases recognizing the existence of a private nuisance in the
absence of direct damage to land is Brown v. Arbuckle."' In that case, a
funeral parlor in a residential area was held to constitute a nuisance in fact in
that:
[T]he establishment of a mortuary and fneral parlor on defendant's prop-
erty would greatly reduce the sale and rental value of plaintiff's property;
that such an establishment would interfere greatly with the comfortable
enjoyment of his property and would be a constant mental irritant to the
plaintiff and members of his family and would cause them to suffer
physical disturbances.' 74
The physical disturbances alleged apparently were merely the physiological
repercussions of the "constant mental irrita[tion]." 75 Dean v. Powell Un-
dertaking Co.' 6 was distinguished as a case involving an allegation that a
funeral parlor was a nuisance per se: "The court [in Dean] correctly found
that a nuisance per se did not exist. However, there was nothing in the
evidence or findings to show that the undertaking establishment was a nui-
sance in fact."'7 7
As Civil Code section 3479178 had not been interpreted to include
funeral parlors as nuisances per se, it was incumbent upon plaintiffs to allege
facts that were embraced by section 3479. This difficulty would not face a
plaintiff in a private nuisance action against allegedly obscene materials,
since the Busch majority has held that obscenity per se does come within
169. Venuto v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 22 Cal. App. 3d 116, 124, 99
Cal. Rptr. 350, 355.
170. Id. at 125, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
171. Id. at 126, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
172. Examples cited in Venuto of actionable private nuisances involving no direct
damage to land nor prevention of its use are smoke from an asphalt mixing plant, noise
and offensive odors from the operation of a refreshment stand, noise and excessive dust
from a rock quarry, smoke from a donkey-engine, discoloration of the plaintiffs building,
and poisonous dust carried by the wind to plaintiff's land. Id.
173. 88 Cal. App. 2d 258, 198 P.2d 550 (1948).
174. Id. at 263, 198 P.2d at 553.
175. "Medical testimony was received to the effect that the mental strain caused
. . . [by the presence of the funeral parlor] would reasonably result in direct physical
disturbances." Id.
176. 55 Cal. App. 545, 203 P. 1015 (1921).
177. 88 Cal. App. 2d at 263-64, 198 P.2d at 553.
178. See note 46 supra.
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section. 3479. Dean was cited by Justice Tobriner in his dissent inBusch for
the proposition that a nuisance must be indecent or offensive to the
senses.179 The court in Brown apparently did not agree. Nor, obviously, did
the majority in Busch.18 The injuries recognized in Brown as sufficient to
entitle the plaintiff to maintain a private nuisance action included: 1) diminu-
tion in the sale and rental values of property, 2) constant mental irritation,
and 3) the physiological repercussions of that mental irritation. Presumably,
plaintiffs alleging that a Busch public nuisance is also a private nuisance as
to them could urge similar allegations of injury.
3. The Argument Against a Private Action
The danger of a private civil action against the dissemination of al-
legedly obscene materials is not so much that plaintiffs in such actions
would win injunctions as that a multiplicity of actions would discourage
publishers, producers, and distributors from having anything to do with
so-called "borderline" materials. Only three years ago the United States
Supreme Court held that the film "Carnal Knowledge" was not obscene. 81
The fact that such litigation reached the highest court of this nation attests to
the fact that the borderline is indeed wide, reaching far into the realm of
protected expression.' 82 Some may scoff at the idea that purveyors of bor-
derline or even almost certainly obscene materials will be deterred by the
threat of litigation, for, indisputably, dealing in such materials is profitable.
If, however, a paperback distributor were faced with several separate actions
in different jurisdictions, the economic burdens of litigation might become
excessive and the chilling effect would take hold. The ramifications of such
an eventuality are at least threefold: Not only would a businessman be
effectively deprived of his stock in trade, but, more importantly, artistic
development and other forms of presumptively protected expression would
suffer; and, in the final analysis, respect for the courts is bound to be
179. See text accompanying notes 81-85 supra.
180. See text accompanying notes 52-57 supra.
181. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
182. As the Supreme Court noted in its opinion in Jenkins, "Carnal Knowledge"
appeared on many lists of 1971's "Ten Best" movies, and Ann Margret was nominated
for an Academy Award for her performance. Id. at 158 & n.5. The movie was "basically
a story of two young college men, roommates and lifelong friends forever preoccupied
with their sex lives." Id. at 158. But there was "no exhibition whatever of the actors'
genitals, lewd or otherwise." Nonetheless, the Georgia Supreme Court had upheld the
trial court's finding that "Carnal Knowledge" was obscene. Justice Gunter dissented in
that decision, citing reviews from Saturday Review, the Washington Post, the New York
Daily News, Time, the Atlanta Constitution, and the Atlanta Journal and noting that none
had given "the slightest indication that the film was obscene-pornographic." He quoted
this language from the Atlanta Journal review: "It is a movie that will be controversial in
the heaviest sense of the word, but it is still one of the best that we have had in a long
time." Jenkins v. State, 230 Ga. 726, 731-32, 199 S.E.2d 183, 186-87 (1973) (Gunter,
J., dissenting).
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impaired. Consider the words of Justice Tobriner, writing for a unanimous
California Supreme Court holding that "Tropic of Cancer" was not
obscene:
Man's drive for self-expression, which over the centuries has built his
monuments, does not stay within set bounds; the creations which yester-
day were the detested and the obscene become the classics of today. The
quicksilver of creativity will not be solidified by legal pronouncement; it
will necessarily flow into new and sometimes frightening fields. If,
indeed, courts try to forbid new and exotic expression they will surely
and fortunatel fail. The new forms of expression, even though formally
banned, will, as they always have, remain alive in man's consciousness.
The court-made excommunication, if it is too wide or if it interferes with
true creativity, will be rejected like incantations of forgotten witch-
doctors. Courts must therefore move here with utmost caution; they tread
in a field where a lack of restraint can only invite defeat and only impair
man's most precious potentiality: his capacity for self-expression. 83
In his dissent inBusch, Justice Tobriner wrote: "Hereafter, the public's
right to read books or magazines, to view plays or motion pictures, can be
permanently curtailed if a city attorney can find a single judge who believes
the material is obscene."'84 The chilling impact on First Amendment interests
would be far greater if "city attorney" were replaced by "private citizen"
in that statement. How, then, can the California courts turn back the threat
of private actions without coming into conflict with the principles of Busch?
To answer that question, it is first necessary to distinguish clearly-as the
courts sometimes have not-between public nuisance and private nuisance.
Though they share a common name, and though they are grounded in the
same statute in California,8 5 public nuisance and private nuisance are dis-
tinctly separate causes of action, with distinctly separate origins.
Public nuisance originated in the English common law as an infringe-
ment of the rights of the Crown, and by the time of Edward III it had been
extended to invasions of public rights. 8 ' Near the end of the nineteenth
century, public nuisance was defined by a leading writer on criminal law as
any "act not warranted by law, or omission to discharge a legal duty, which
obstructs or causes inconvenience or damage to the public in the exercise of
rights common to all Her Majesty's subjects."' 8 This broad catch-all was
used to reach such harms' as interference with a market, smoke from a
183. Zeitlin v. Amebergh, 59 Cal. 2d 901, 922-23, 383 P.2d 152, 166, 31 Cal.
Rptr. 800, 814 (1963).
184. 17 Cal. 3d at 63, 550 P.2d at 613, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 341 (emphasis in origi-
nal).
185. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3479 (West 1970) (see note 46 supra).
186. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B, Comment a at 16 (Tent. Draft
No. 16, 1970).
187. Id. at 16-17.
188. The term "nuisance" is derived from the French word for "harm." RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes, ch. 40, at 6 (Tent. Draft No. 16,
1970).
Spring 1977]
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
limepit, and diversion of water from a mill.189 The single thread that seemed
to tie public nuisance actions together as a distinct realm of the common law
was the nature of the interest being invaded or threatened. That interest was
always public in nature.1 9°
The private nuisance action, on the other hand, developed as an entirely
separate branch of the law, designed to remedy interferences with the private
use and enjoyment of plaintiffs' land-or interest in land.' 9' Private nui-
sance is distinguishable from trespass in that it does not necessarily involve
interference with possession of land.' In terms of the interests being pro-
tected, however, private nuisance seems more akin to trespass than to public
nuisance. 93 Contrasting private nuisance with public nuisance, Dean Pro-
sser had this to say:
These two lines of development, the one narrowly restricted to the
invasion of interests in the use or enjoyment of land, and the other
extending to virtually any form of annoyance or inconvenience interfer-
ing with common public rights, have led to the prevailing uncertainty as
to what a nuisance is. A private nuisance is a civil wrong, based on a
disturbance of rights in land. The remedy for it lies in the hands of the
individual whose rights have been disturbed. A public or common nui-
sance, on the other hand, is a species of catch-all criminal offense,
consisting of an interference with the rights of the community at large,
which may include anything from the obstruction of a highway to a
public gaming-house or indecent exposure. As in the case of other
crimes, the normal remedy is in the hands of the state. The two have
almost nothing in common, except that each causes inconvenience to
someone, and it would have been fortunate if they had been called from
the beginning by different names.' 94
Furthermore, a public nuisance action brought by a private individual
seems more akin to a private nuisance action than to a public nuisance action
brought by a public official. This is so because of the nature of the legally
protected interest involved in a public nuisance action brought by a private
individual. If the activity complained of is not also a private nuisance, the
individual plaintiff, to gain standing to bring a public nuisance action, must
show injury different in kind, not merely degree, from that of the general
public.' 95 In other words, the plaintiff must show that a different interest-
189. PROSSER, supra note 130, at 572.
190. Id. at 585.
191. Id. at 591. See Lind v. City of San Luis Obispo, 109 Cal. 340, 344, 42 P.
437, 438 (1895).
192. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D, Comment e at 43 (Tent. Draft
No. 16, 1970).
193. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D, Comments e & f at 43-44
(Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970).
194. PROSSER, supra note 130, at 572-73.
195. Brown v. Rea, 150 Cal. 171, 88 P. 713 (1907); Venuto v. Owens-Coming
Fiberglas Corp., 22 Cal. App. 3d 116, 99 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1971); Voorheis v. Tidewater
S. Ry., 41 Cal. .App. 315, 182 P. 797 (1919); Donahue v. Stockton Gas and Elec. Co.,
6 Cal. App. 276, 92 P. 196 (1907); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3493 (West 1970).
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private to him or her-has been invaded. Thus, both a private nuisance
action and a public nuisance action brought by a private individual require
an invasion of a legally protected private interest. A public nuisance action
brought by a public official, on the other hand, requires an invasion of a
legally protected public interest.
With these distinctions in mind, it is easier to perceive limitations that a
court might logically impose on the Busch decision. In the Busch context,
the interest being protected is public morality-that is, a public interest.
This interest has long been recognized in California as one deserving the
protection of public nuisance law.196 It is the sort of interest, however, that
is to be protected in the courts only by public officials, in the absence of
special injury. 9 '
Houses of prostitution are classic examples of public nuisances predi-
cated on an invasion of a legally protected public interest. In the case of a
public nuisance action brought by a private individual against a house of
prostitution, Prosser had this to say: "[T]here is no difficulty in finding a
different kind of damage. . . . where there is any substantial interference
with the plaintiffs use and enjoyment of his own land, as where a bawdy
house, which disturbs the public morals, also makes life disagreeable in the
house next door."' 98 As for a private nuisance action against a house of
prostitution, "[c]onduct which is. . . destructive of the general welfare, as
in the case of a house of prostitution, is nearly always a private nuisance
when it interferes with the enjoyment of the plaintiff's property."' 99
In the California case of Farmer v. Behmer,"'0 a private individual was
granted injunctive relief against a house of prostitution because "[t]he pre-
mises had by the conduct of their occupants become 'indecent and offensive
to the senses,' and, as found by the court, 'an obstruction to the free use of
property' of plaintiff so as to 'interfere with' its 'comfortable enjoyment'
and the 'comfortable enjoyment of life' while residing on it, and was and is a
nuisance. ' ' Thus, a house of prostitution, though it is a per se invasion of
a legally protected public interest, must be shown to be a nuisance in fact as
to a private individual seeking relief in the courts.
In the case of a theater such as that involved in Busch-in the absence,
at least, of anything offensive about the exterior of the premises-the only
196. See, e.g., Pon v. Wittman, 147 Cal. 280, 81 P. 984 (1905); Weis v. Superior
Court, 30 Cal. App. 730, 159 P. 464 (1916); Farmer v. Behmer, 9 Cal. App. 733, 100
P. 901 (1909).
197. Venuto v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 22 Cal. App. 3d 116, 123, 99
Cal. Rptr. 350, 355 (1971).
198. PROSSER, supra note 130, at 588-89.
199. Id. at 598.
200. 9 Cal. App. 773, 100 P. 901 (1909).
201. Id. at 778, 100 P. at 902-03. The court here seems to be talking about both
special injury in the public nuisance context and private nuisance.
Spring 1977]
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
interest being invaded under a strict reading of Busch is public in nature. If,
as in Farmer, the proprietors or occupants by their conduct invaded more
than the interest in preserving public morality, they could be held answer-
able in a private action. But the existence of the theater itself, its movies
being shown behind closed doors, would not necessarily constitute an inva-
sion of a private interest sufficient to support either a private nuisance action
or a public nuisance action brought by a private individual.
The threat of the private action against allegedly obscene materials is
not illusory. In Harmer v. A Motion Picture Entitled "The Devil in Miss
Jones,"22 the Second District Court of Appeal held, in an unpublished
opinion, that plaintiffs had failed to allege facts sufficient to support just
such a private action. The trial court in that case, prior to the supreme
court's Busch decision, had sustained defendants' general demurrer and
dismissed without leave to amend. The court of appeal, however, in the
wake of Busch, remanded with instructions to allow plaintiffs to file an
amended complaint, saying: "Nothing in the complaint suggests that the
plaintiffs cannot amend to show special injury sufficient to justify the
maintenance of a private suit to abate a public nuisance or a controversy with
a potential for substantial injury to them justifying their maintenance of a
declaratory relief action."23
V. Conclusion
In reading obscenity into the state's general nuisance statutes, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court has assumed a legislative role and compounded the
vagueness difficulties inherent in the exclusion-by-definition approach to
obscenity regulation. Without the benefit of legislative debate and repre-
sentative decisionmaking, the court has created a cause of action under
which expression can be suppressed without a trial by jury and without proof
beyond a reasonable doubt that it is obscene. Busch was improvidently
decided and should be overruled.
However, if the supreme court chooses to stand by its decision in
Busch, it should be limited in application to its specific facts. District attor-
neys and city attorneys now have authority to bring public nuisance actions
against allegedly obscene materials. Boards of supervisors and city councils,
through district attorneys and city attorneys, also are empowered by statute
to initiate proceedings. There is a greater danger to First Amendment inter-
ests here because of the susceptibility of local representative bodies to pres-
sure from morally outraged minorities. But essentially the same consid-
202. 2d Civ. No. 43778 (Cal. Ct. App., 2d Dist.) (Sept. 17, 1976).
203. Id., slip op. at 16. Rather than return to the trial court, plaintiffs sought a
hearing before the California Supreme Court, which denied their petition. 18 Cal. 3d (ad-
vance sheets, vol. 33) (p. 3 of supreme court minutes) (Nov. 12, 1976). A petition for a
writ of certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court, April 18, 1977. 45
U.S.L.W. 3690 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1977) (No. 76-1110).
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erations that make a district attorney or city attorney hesitant to bring an
obscenity action on his or her own should operate as a countercheck. How-
ever, if actions are allowed to be brought by private citizens, the threat to
First Amendment interests could reach truly alarming proportions. The Cal i-
fomia Supreme Court thus should take the first available opportunity to state
clearly that the interest recognized as warranting the protection of the nui-
sance statutes in Busch is purely public in nature and that private actions
therefore will not lie.
Many will contend that Busch is a welcome alternative to criminal
obscenity prosecutions-that an injunction is far preferable to a jail cell. The
objections to this contention are twofold. First, the civil injunctive alterna-
tive is nothing more than a stopgap measure. What is needed is a thorough
reappraisal of the basic premises upon which Roth and its progeny rest.
Extensive research has not indicated any rational grounds for suppressing
obscenity, at least in the case of dissemination to consenting adults, and
eventually the courts will have to recognize this. Secondly, even if such a
reappraisal is not to be-in which case it must be admitted that an injunction
is, indeed, far preferable to a jail cell-the civil injunctive approach to
obscenity regulation should be carefully defined, with proper constitutional
safeguards, by statute.
Problems of vagueness are rampant enough in the realm of obscenity
regulation; piling on the vagaries of the jungle surrounding California's
general nuisance statutes is a mistake. If there is to be a civil injunctive
remedy against obscenity in California, it should be left to the legislature to
enact a carefully defined scheme within which that remedy can be applied.
The alternative is judicial uncertainty and inevitable repression of new and
daring forms of expression that deserve First Amendment protection.
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